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Abstract 
This year marks the formal opening of trade negotiations between the world's two 
largest trading partners – the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). 
It is expected that the transatlantic partnership negotiations will face significant obstacles on 
both sides, which in turn places the burden on economists to provide plausible impact 
assessments to inform policy makers. Unfortunately, modelling databases whilst rich with 
detailed disaggregated representations of tariff barriers, still underperform in the case of non- 
tariff measure counterparts.  Indeed, unlike conventional tariff measures, NTMs do not have a 
transparent price effect which can be readily inserted into an economic model. Over the last 
decade, the usage of gravity models has received recognition as one such tool for 
understanding the 'part-worth' of NTM measures on trade restrictiveness. This paper also 
employs a gravity approach, whilst the explorative nature of the research restricts the current 
focus to four agro-food sectors.  
Preliminary results suggest that NTMs impose a relatively equivalent ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE) trade cost on trade flows of cattle meat and processed rice in both 
directions.  In the case of cattle meat, this appears to be consistent with the retaliatory nature 
of NTM instruments employed by US importers on EU bans. In beverages and tobacco and 
dairy products, however, the AVE of the NTM is higher on EU imports of US goods. In the 
case of beverages and tobacco, this finding appears to be consistent with the qualitative 
survey work conducted in ECORYS (2009), whilst the result for US dairy imports from the 
EU remains at first sight, counterintuitive and deserving of further research. 
Key words: non-tariff measures, gravity equation, residual approach, agri-food   
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1. Introduction 
Since the Second World War, the transatlantic partnership forged between the EU and the 
USA has traditionally carried considerable economic and political weight, which has indelibly shaped 
the course of world events. Over the last two decades, however, the political and economic landscape 
has shifted in large part due to the continued emergence of the 'BRICs' and the continued fallout of the 
financial crisis, which has saddled many western economies with heavy national debts, high 
unemployment and sluggish growth. From a trade perspective, both factors played a role in the Doha 
multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. Trade negotiators from crisis ridden 
developed countries faced mercantilist pressures from their own politicians which curbed the ambition 
of the talks, whilst the enhanced presence of the developing country lobby sought to attain an 
improved negotiating position (particularly on agricultural trade), which had hitherto been largely 
absent in previous multilateral negotiations.   
As the Doha talks reached a deadlock, both the EU and USA actively pursued 'second best' 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). For example, the USA has actively forged PTAs with the 
Republic of Korea and Colombia, whilst the EU has recently signed accords or is close to doing so 
with the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Finally, in 2011 the seeds were planted for a potential EU-
USA PTA at a high level working group meeting on jobs and growth (HLWG). Under the auspices of 
this initiative a final report was released in February 2013
2
 in which it was concluded that the sheer 
weight of the bilateral trade volumes under consideration rendered potentially attractive economic 
gains to both partners from liberalisation, even with low initial levels of tariff protection. Taking a 
broader perspective, it is envisaged that bilateral regulatory integration on issues relating to phyto-
sanitary (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) and intellectual property rights (IPR) could even pave 
the way for a set of corresponding global trading standards in sanitary and, leading to concomitant 
positive spill-over effects for third countries.  
A review of the literature reveals two reports (ECORYS, 2009;CEPR, 2013) on US-EU trade, 
both of which converge on the notion that the economic gains reaped by each partner from the 
harmonisation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) far outweigh those expected from 'conventional' tariff 
reductions. Given that the GTAP database lacks any estimates of NTMs, both studies turn to (inter 
alia) the gravity approach to enumerate their trade restrictiveness. Accordingly, the current paper also 
employs a gravity specification, although the methodological approach employed attempts to address 
some of the perceived weaknesses in the aforementioned studies in an attempt to present more 
accurate estimates of NTMs for further policy analysis. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two provides a revision of the relevant 
gravity literature with recommendations for the approach adopted here. Section three describes the 
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gravity model, the methodological choice followed and the dataset. Section four presents and 
discusses the results, whilst section five concludes.  
2. Literature review 
UNCTAD provides a comprehensive classification of NTMs that distinguishes up to 14 types 
(WTO, 2012) although only for half of them official information is collected. These categories include 
SPS, TBT, but also price and quantity controls (licenses, quotas, bans)
3
. Some of the regulations may 
pursuit legitimate domestic objectives such as guarantee food safety and citizens' health, in which 
case, trade frictions arise due to lack of harmonization of national regulations. Some other NTMs, 
however, may be put in place to deliberately impose a barrier to trade. Nevertheless, the literature 
aiming at quantifying and evaluating the impact of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) usually refer only to 
non-price and non-quantity trade restrictions measures, either at the border, such as red-tape 
bureaucracy, and behind the border, in which case, more attention is paid to SPS and TBT (ECORYS, 
2009).  
The gravity equation has become a common approach to analyse the trade cost of NTMs, 
whilst two approaches, direct and indirect methods, are identified. On the one hand, direct methods 
quantify NTMs using inventories of standards and regulations per industry and country, notifications 
by importer countries to the WTO about the implementation of new regulations and their accordance 
with international rules (UNCTAD TRAINS Database), or complaints by traders (WTO Trade Policy 
Reviews, CoreNTM), from which either dummy variables (to reflect the presence or not of an NTM), 
frequencies or coverage ratios (percentage of products or of trade within a sector affected by NTMs) 
are calculated. A common criticism is that these methods neglect the relative importance of each 
measure in restricting trade, while countries more transparent in reporting their regulations appear to 
be more restrictive (Chen and Novy, 2012). Given the pervasiveness of sanitary standards in agri-food 
products, there are several applications in the agri-food sectors that, however, tend to be sector 
specific. For instance, Grant and Anders (2010) analyse the reorientation of seafood trade following 
stricter food safety measures imposed by the US, using the number of detentions or refusals for a 
particular exporter as an additional explanatory variable; and Disdier and Marette (2010) focus on 
regulations on the maximum antibiotic residues limit on crustaces in main importing countries. 
Additional direct methods involve the collection of exhaustive databases on specific NTMs, 
usually, technical barriers and SPS, in specific countries and sectors. Winchester et al. (2012) build up 
a database with sanitary, phytosanitary and conformity measures in the EU and 9 trading countries, 
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applied in the agri-food sectors, from which, several indexes are constructed representing the degree of 
regulatory heterogeneity across countries, which further feed a gravity equation to evaluate their 
impact on trade for the pool of fruits, vegetables and grains sectors. The above method, however, faces 
the limitation of the sector and time coverage of the measurements. 
ECORYS (2009) and Sunesen et al.,(2009) use scores based on perceptions of business about 
difficulties of market access as a proxy for the NTM indicator in a gravity equation; then, the NTM-
tariff equivalent is input in a CGE model to simulate the economic impact of a trade agreement 
between the EU and the US, and the EU and Japan, respectively. Although the sector coverage is 
wide, including 12 manufacturing sectors and 6 services sectors, agri-food is collapsed to a single 
"processed food" industry. Results of the gravity estimation on the food sector suggest that divergence 
in regulations imply a trade cost increase of 73% for food exports from the EU to the US, and 57% on 
the opposite direction, and 25% for EU exports into Japan. Nevertheless, the NTM approach based on 
surveys can be subject to criticisms due to the limitation of the sample (of firms) representativeness 
and the subjectivity of the measurement. 
As an alternative, either borders (eg. Chevassus-Lozza et al., 2008; Winchester, 2009) or fixed 
effects (Fontagné et al., 2011) have also been used in the gravity literature as proxies for NTMs. To 
date, Kee et al. (2009) provide the most comprehensive quantification of NTMs impact across sectors 
(they use H6 disaggregation) and countries, estimating restrictiveness indexes from a dummy type 
variable that account for the presence of any type of non-tariff barrier to trade plus domestic support, 
using an import equation (no bilateral trade as in the gravity equation). Results on agricultural 
products, report a mean NTM ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of 27%, significantly higher than the 10% 
found for manufacturing goods, with dairy products reaching a maximum of 46%. The authors also 
find that the contribution of NTMs and agricultural domestic support of the overall level of protection 
(that is, including tariffs) increases with GDP per capita. 
Recently, Li and Beghin (2012) conducted a meta-analysis to explain the variation of trade 
effects of health, safety and sanitary regulations and standards, encountered by the previous literature 
(27 papers are considered), and accounting for different estimation techniques, NTM measurement, 
data disaggregation and size, and different approaches to deal with zero-trade data. The study finds 
that the impact of NTMs on agriculture is likely to be more negative than in manufacturing sectors, 
and in this effect is reinforced when trade is flowing from developing to developed countries.  
Alternatively, the gravity model can be used as an indirect method to estimate the overall 
impact of NTMs on trade rather than the specific effect of a particular NTM. The gravity equation 
belongs to the "quantity gap" indirect approach by opposition to the "price gap". Indirect methods start 
by acknowledging that NTMs (imposed by the importer country) are likely to cause distortions in 
trade, reducing imports and/or increasing import prices. Quantity methods are recommended when 
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either prices do not exist because NTMs are prohibitive and preclude trade altogether (Ferrantino, 
2006), or when prices are difficult to measure and compare, as in the case of sectors that embed highly 
differentiated products. In any case, the relatively more abundance and degree of disaggregation of 
trade data has favoured the use of the quantity gap approach, while the use of price wedges is very 
scarce (Bradford, 2003). 
The "quantity gap approach" compares the value of observed imports, constrained by NTMs, 
with the normal value of imports that would have prevailed in the absence of NTMs. The gravity 
model allows the estimation of what this normal value of imports would be (Ferrantino, 2006). This is 
also called the "residual gravity approach", as the NTM ad-valorem equivalent is obtained from the 
residuals of the gravity equation. 
The residual approach has been more extensively applied in services sectors. Earlier 
applications include Park (2002), and more recently Francois et al. (2005) and Guillin (2011). An 
application to the agri-food sectors is conducted by Philippidis and Sanjuán (2007a, 2007b). Most of 
the aforementioned applications have as a common denominator that the tariff equivalent for NTM 
feeds into a General Equilibrium Model to better ascertain the impacts of trade liberalization on 
particular bilateral trade agreements. With the exception of Guillin (2011) who uses a two-stage 
Heckman model, none of the previous literature using the residual approach has addressed the issue of 
zero trade values. 
To summarise, no gravity approach is exempt of criticisms. Tariff equivalents derived from 
NTMs variables or indexes are very sector and NTM specific, and depend crucially on the quality of 
the measurement of the NTM under consideration. The accuracy of the NTM calculation in the 
residuals-gravity approach, on the other hand, depends heavily on the estimation technique and the 
quality of the model specification (Ferrantino, 2006). 
In this paper, the residual gravity approach is favoured, as we are interested in a common 
framework for a large coverage of disaggregated sectors. Besides, the residual approach provides a 
combined estimate of all potential NTMs trade costs while it is flexible enough to allow the 
computation of bi-directional NTMs trade costs. In particular, we aim at estimating tariff equivalents 
for NTMs, on agri-food sectors using the GTAP database as the main data source, and we will address 
the zero trade value issue by using the Pseudo Poisson Model (PPML) as recommended by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
3. The gravity specification                       
3.1 Model development 
In its simplest form, the gravity model posits that trade between two countries is a positive 
function of GDP (i.e., ‘mass’) and a negative function of trade costs (i.e., distance) (Tinbergen, 1962, 
Pullianen, 1963). Empirical applications have extended this specification to encompass (inter alia) 
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preferential trade (Kandogan, 2008; Foster et al., 2011; Hayakawa and Yamashita, 2011), contiguity 
(Bergstrand, 1985; Thoumi, 1989), common language and/or ex-colonial ties (e.g. Rose and van 
Wincoop, 2001), or even to cater for the effect of distance along different hemispheres as well as 
remoteness (Melitz, 2007). Other developments (Arnon et al., 1996; Hallack, 2006) account for the so 
called ‘Linder’ hypothesis (Linder, 1961), which posits that countries with similar per capita incomes 
have a greater tendency to engage in mutual trade. This is seen as a test of the monopolistic intra-
industry hypothesis, whilst the polar opposite that differences in per capita incomes (which proxy for 
differing factor intensities) promote trade can be interpreted as support for the HO hypothesis. 
Thanks to successive underpinnings in the economic theory (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 
1985, 1989; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Helpman, 1987) the gravity equation has regained 
credibility. More recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) formalised a paradigm for 
subsequent econometric gravity work, providing an explicit treatment of prices (first raised by 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989)) whilst accommodating the empirical observation of 
‘cross-hauling’ of differentiated products. Expressed as a CES preference function of the form: 
σ1
ij
ij
w
ij
ij
ΠP
t
Y
YY
X









                                                    (1) 
where Xij are exports from country i to country j; Yi and Yj represent GDP, Yw is world GDP, 
tij are trade costs, expressed as "iceberg cost" i.e. tij = 1 + τij
4
 (i.e. no trade costs imply tij=1); and σ is 
the elasticity of substitution between varieties (i.e. countries). The variables Пi and Pj are price indices, 
denominated as ‘multilateral resistance’ terms which are dependent of trade barriers (tij). Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003, 2004) stress the importance of controlling for these multilateral resistance terms 
arguing that trade between two regions depends on the bilateral barrier between them relative to the 
average trade barriers that both regions face with all their trading partners. Empirically, these 
unobserved multilateral resistance terms are proxied with country specific dummies (Feenstra, 2004; 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).  
In attempting to quantify policy induced trade gains, it is acknowledged (Vollrath et al., 2009) 
that gravity studies need to accommodate measures of trade protection on a commodity by commodity 
basis. Although there exist a number of recent gravity studies which explore this issue (e.g., de Frahan 
and Vancauteren, 2006; Vollrath et al., 2009; Ghazalian et al., 2009; Tamini et al., 2010; Raimondi 
and Olper, 2011), in all cases (except the latter) the commodity coverage is limited to two or three 
sectors, whilst none of the above extends the definition of protectionism to explicitly account for 
export refunds.  
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7 
 
From an econometric standpoint, earlier studies favoured the use of an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) log-linear specification. Subsequent literature (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 2011) 
demonstrates that this estimator does not adequately cater for zero value observations, whilst the 
expected value of the log-linearized error will in general depend on the covariates and therefore lead to 
problems of heteroskedasticity. This leads Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006; 2011) to recommend the 
Poisson estimator, which belongs to the category of count models. 
3.2. Methodology: the Poisson model 
Trade observations are not pure count-, but rather non-negative continuous data. 
Notwithstanding, the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator still provides consistent estimates 
(Woolridge, 2002), in which case it is referred to more precisely as the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood (PML) estimator (Gourieoroux et al., 1984). The model assumes that the observed volume 
of trade between countries i and j, Xij follows a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean (µij) 
which is an exponential function of the explanatory variables z: μij = exp(β’z) 
5
. 
Extensions to the Poisson model include the Negative Binomial, which allows for over-
dispersion (i.e. the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean), and Zero Inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) and Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB), that account for an excess of zeros in the 
dependent variable. Previous applications of these larger variety of count models to the gravity 
equation can be found in Burger et al.(2009), and Philippidis et al.(2013). Nevertheless, we will keep 
the simplest form, the Poisson model, as a first approach to quantify NTM AVEs, for simplicity. 
3.3. Data and final model specification 
Although the final intention is to derive NTM specific to each of the 20 agri-food sectors in 
the GTAP database, we initiate this work with four sectors: cattle meat, dairy products, processed rice 
and beverages and tobacco (descriptions included in Table 1). 
Table 1. Description of the analysed sectors and accompanying codes 
Sector 
code 
Name of the sector Definition 
cmt Meat of cattle Meat of cattle, sheep, goats and horses 
mil Dairy products All dairy products 
pcr Processed rice Milled rice 
b_t Beverages and tobacco products Cigarettes, cigars, wines and spirits, beer 
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The final form of our gravity specification is presented in equation (2), where the sub-index i 
and j refer to the exporter and importer, respectively, whilst t, refers to the year: 
 [    ]          [                                                  
                                                  ∑      
 
   ∑      
 
       ]    
      (2) 
The distance variable (Dist) is complemented by contiguity (Cont), the North-South 
hemispheres distance (NoSo) and remoteness (Remote). In terms of historical and cultural linkages, we 
include both common language (Lang) and colonial ties (Col) dummies. Additionally, the squared 
difference (SqIncome) (Linder hypothesis) and the product of GDPs (Gdp) in per capita GDPs are 
incorporated
6
. Finally, bilateral import tariffs (Mt) are inserted into the gravity regression. The gravity 
equation includes fixed effects for both time (Y2004) and country (exporter and importer) (Fi and Fj). 
The country fixed effects proxy the unobserved theoretical multilateral resistance terms posed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004), while both, country and year fixed effects control for 
correlation between omitted and observed variables (Greene, 2002). A full description of the 
explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. The econometric software STATA 12.0 has been applied 
in the estimation. 
Data for 2004 and 2007 on bilateral trade flows, ad-valorem applied tariffs by commodity and 
GDP for 128 regions are taken from release 8.0 (Aguiar et al., 2012) of the GTAP database. The 
population data needed to calculate per capita income is obtained from the World Bank (2011). 
Bilateral distance, contiguity, common official language, colonial linkages data, and the latitudes 
needed to calculate the variable NoSo are taken from CEPII (2011).  
A cursory glance at the data shows that the application of export refunds has been incidental in 
both years, reducing even more its applicability in 2007. As an example, 93% of the bilateral trade 
routes do not apply any export refund in dairy products, with this percentage going up to 96% in 
beverages and tobacco, 99% in cattle meat and 100% in processed rice. 
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Table 2. Variable descriptions in the gravity equation 
Variable Description 
Xijt Value of imports into country j from country i at world prices in year t 
Mtijt Power of the import tariff rate (AdvRateijt) applied by importer j on imports from i in year t, 
measured in ad-valorem equivalents, in logs: 









100
AdvRate
1lnMt
ijt
ijt  
Distij Great circle distance between the capitals of country i and j, in logs 
Contigij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share a border, and 0 otherwise 
Langij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share the same official language, and 0 
otherwise; 
Colijt Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j have or have had a colonial linkage 
NoSoij Difference in latitudes between countries i and j, in logs: ln(latitudei – latitudej) 
Remoteit Indicator of remoteness of country i in year t, calculated as a GDP weighted average of 
distance to the countries with which country i trades: 












 
T(i)
j
ij
itWt
jt
it Dist
GDPGDP
GDP
lnRemote  
where Distij is the distance between i and j (defined as above), GDPWt is the world GDP in 
year t, and T(i) is the number of the destination countries of exports from i. T(i) can vary for 
each i, for instance, when i is a composite, the number of destination countries is 95, while 
when i is an individual country, T is 94 
Gdpijt  Product of GDP in country i and country j in year t, in logs: ln(GDPit  GDPjt), with GDP 
measured in million US $ (in nominal terms) 
Sqincomeijt Square of the difference in per capita income in countries i and j, in logs: ln((GDPpcit – 
GDPpcjt)
2
) with GDPpc measured in US$ per habitant  (in nominal terms) 
Y2004t Dummy variable that values 1 when the year t is 2004 
Fi (Fj) Fixed effects for exporter (importer) country i (j). Fi(Fj) are dummy variables, that value 1 
when the exporter (importer) is i (j), and 0 otherwise 
3.4. The NTM ad-valorem equivalent 
Discrepancies between actual (AXij) and predicted (PXij) values of trade are taken to be 
indicative of trade barriers, as the prediction by the gravity equation is assumed to reflect potential 
trade under frictionless conditions. Given that applied tariffs are included explicitly in the model, trade 
barriers implied by the residuals are considered to be due to non-tariff measures. Thus, the trade cost tij 
in equation (1), is assumed to reflect the NTMs proxied by the residuals. After linearizing taking logs: 
 (   
   )
   
  (     
   )
   
 
    
    
⁄                                                          (3) 
where    
    is the bilateral ad valorem (or tariff) equivalent (AVE) of all the NTMs imposed 
by country j to imports coming from country i. 
Following Francois et al (2005) and Park (2002), however, AVEs are not calculated for each 
pair of countries engaged in trade but for each importing country. Thus, for each country j, actual and 
predicted imports are summed over all its trade partners:     ∑     
 
         and     
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∑     
 
         (in our application N=128). Predicted imports larger than observed imports are 
indicative of the existence of trade barriers. In order to quantify how big these trade barriers are, we 
need to compare this ratio with some benchmark, which as in Francois et al.(2005) and Park(2002) is 
chosen as the largest value of the observed to predicted ratio, and which is interpreted as a free-trade 
benchmark ratio (      ⁄ ): 
(  
   )
   
   
      ⁄
      ⁄
⁄               (4) 
Solving for the tariff equivalent (   
   ) of non-tariff measures imposed by country j: 
  
     (
      ⁄
      ⁄
)
 
   ⁄
                                                   (5) 
At the benchmark, there are not any non-tariff measures affecting trade, and the ad-valorem 
equivalent is zero. 
As our interest lies in the specific trade restrictions that may be in place between the EU and 
US, we modify the calculus of the NTMs AVE to account for the direction of trade and the specific 
routes. To do so, we differentiate between three different origins for the EU imports: US, EU and the 
rest of the world (RoW); and three different origins for the US imports: EU, NAFTA and RoW
7
. Then, 
the sum of observed and predicted trade in (4) refers to the countries within each group. For instance, 
the AVE NTM of imports into the EU coming from the US is: 
      
     (
              ⁄
      ⁄
)
 
   ⁄
                                            (6) 
Where         (       ) adds up observed (predicted) imports coming from the US to any 
country in the EU:          ∑       
  
    and         ∑       
  
   . Given that the sample 
used in the estimation includes two years of data, 2004 and 2007, actual and predicted trade is 
averaged across years. Sectorial substitution elasticities (σ) across importing sources are taken from 
the GTAP database. 
4. Results 
4.1. Estimation results 
The estimation results obtained with the Poisson model for each of the four agri-food sectors 
analysed are presented in Table 3. 
Focusing on tariff variables, we observe that in all regressions ad-valorem tariffs (Mt) have 
the expected negative sign and the impact is significant. The mean elasticity for tariffs is reported as -
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0.473, such that, on average, trade increases by 0.473% when the tariff rate falls by 1%. This result 
masks the heterogeneity across sectors, where dairy (mil) trade is found to be the most elastic to tariff 
rate falls. 
Our tariff results are close to those obtained by Philippidis et al. (2013), using also the GTAP 
database (but referred to 2001 and 2004 and 95 regions), whilst they represent an improvement on 
previous cross sectional studies using the GTAP database (Kuiper and van Tongeren, 2006; Philippidis 
et al., 2007a, 2007b), which found examples of non-significant and positive tariff parameter values 
across agro-food sectors.
 
Vollrath et al. (2009) greatly reduce the number of (spurious) positive tariff 
parameter estimates, although the statistical significance of tariff impacts on trade volumes is limited 
(including aggregate agricultural trade across three years, 1995, 2000 and 2005). In contrast, in a 
further cross section study for 2005 employing a random parameter probit estimation procedure 
(Ghazalian et al., 2009), tariff parameters are found to be statistically significant in the chosen sample 
of three meat sectors
8
. Finally, employing a two stage Heckman estimation procedure with average 
trade values for the years 2002-2004, Raimondi and Olper (2011) find insignificant tariff parameters 
in six of their 18 agro-food sectors considered, as well as their aggregated agro-food sector. 
The results suggest that transportation costs (proxied by ‘distance’) have a negative and highly 
significant impact in all sectors; a result that is supported by the majority of (agro-food) gravity 
studies. Comparing with trade protection across all sectors, distance is found to have a stronger 
(absolute) impact on trade flows with a mean elasticity of -1.163. The most sensitive trade changes 
due to distance occur in cattle meat and processed rice, with values larger than 1.2 in absolute value, 
whilst in dairy and beverages, the response of trade is slightly less elastic, with values, nevertheless 
close to unity. Interestingly, when measuring distance along the North-South axis, our results appear 
to support the notion of a mitigating impact of North-South trade (NoSo) on distance (Melitz, 2007), 
where we find a positive and significant parameter estimate in two sectors, cattle meat and beverages 
(Table 3). Surprisingly, in dairy products we discover a statistically significant negative impact which 
may simply be due to the fact that differences in production opportunities along the North-South axis 
are not so relevant for this sector. Importantly, our elasticity estimates for ‘distance’ and ‘North-South’ 
variables lie within the range of estimates in the empirical literature. Moreover, we find that the 
constraining effect that distance plays on trade is considerably stronger than the promoting effect 
caused by the differences in latitudes between countries, which is consistent with the findings of 
Melitz (2007). 
  
                                                 
8
 Employing trade data for the same year (i.e., 2005), the significance of tariffs for ‘bovine meat’ in Ghazalian et 
al.,(2009) is not supported by Vollrath et al. (2009). This may be due to either the estimation procedure 
employed, and/or the degree of aggregation of the red meat sector. 
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients of the gravity equation with the Poisson model 
a,b, 
 cmt mil pcr b_t Mean 
c
 
Mtij -0.452
*    
(0.262) -0.899
*** 
(0.041) -0.260
*** 
(0.043) -0.282
***
(0.025) -0.473 
Distij -1.259
***
(0.091) -1.078
***
 (0.006) -1.346
***
 (0.016) -0.970
***
 (0.004) -1.163 
Contigij +0.580
***
 (0.157) +0.678
***
 (0.011) +0.563
***
 (0.034) +0.408
***
 (0.009) 75.42% 
Langij +0.305    (0.216) +0.284
***
 (0.012) -0.307
***
 (0.028) +0.303
***
 (0.009) 19.35% 
Colij +0.196    (0.193) +0.357
***
 (0.014) +0.347
***
 (0.048) +0.522
***
 (0.009) 43.64% 
NoSoij +0.152
***
 (0.057) -0.026
***
 (0.004) -0.009     (0.008) +0.158
***
 (0.003) 0.071 
Remotei -5.301     (6.422) +2.215
***
 (0.824) -3.103
*     
(1.655) -1.590
***
 (0.415) -0.620 
Sqincomeij -0.018     (0.020) -0.060
***
 (0.002) -0.067
***
(0.003) -0.068
***
 (0.001) -0.049 
LL -49009.4 -52552.4 -20986.3 -101879.1  
Wald Chi
2 d
 19549.5 375800.0 197835.2 374702.6  
% zero trade 
values 
2.0% 2.5% 22.0% 0.3%  
N obs. 32546 32546 32546 32546  
a 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for the year, and country-specific fixed effects are not reported for space 
saving reasons; ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% of level of significance, 
respectively. 
b 
The sector codes are described in Table 1 and the variable abbreviations in Table 2 
c
 Mean across sectors of percentage change in expected value of bilateral trade following 1% change in the 
explanatory variable or elasticity (in continuous variables); and the mean of the sectoral percentage change in 
expected value of bilateral trade when the dummy variable equals 1:  1)exp(*100 j  (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998). Non-significant (at 10%) coefficients are replaced by zero in the computation. 
 
d
 Statistic that tests for the general significance of the model 
Comparing across continuous explanatory variables, ‘remoteness’ exerts the strongest 
(absolute) influence over bilateral trade with a mean of -0.620, where in the current study this effect is 
statistically significant and positive (as expected) only in one sector (mil). On the other hand, a 
statistically significant counter-intuitive (negative) impact is found in two sectors (pcr and b_t, 
although the first one only at 10%). Further inquiries are needed to find an explanation for this result. 
Comparing between categorical variables, contiguity (common border) is found to have the 
most notable impact, with statistically significant effects in all four agri-food sectors. Examining the 
mean impact on trade (Table 3), the border-sharing effect increases bilateral trade by 75.42% with 
respect to those countries which are not contiguous. As expected, a common language exhibits a 
positive (albeit weaker) impact on bilateral trade, and this effect is found to be positive and 
statistically significant in two sectors (mil and b_t). Colonial links are also found to encourage 
bilateral trade in 3 out of the 4 sectors, with an important mean trade increase of 43.64%.  
Finally, the results of the gravity model offers some evidence of a Linder effect (sqincome) 
across our agri-food sectors; that is, a smaller difference in partner per capita incomes results in larger 
trade flows (negative coefficient). Statistical significance and correct negative signs are found in three 
sectors (mil, pcr and b_t). 
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4.2. The Ad-valorem equivalent results 
In Table 4 bilateral trade between the selected regions (EU, US, NAFTA and Rest of the 
World) in the computation of NTMs is shown. Total agri-food trade from the US to the EU amounts to 
9933 million $, while this figure duplicates in the opposite direction (18940 million $) (panel a, Table 
4). Therefore, any potential reduction in costs derived from the reduction of NTMs may be of 
significant relevance especially for the EU. 
Among the four sectors considered, beverages and tobacco is the most important, accounting 
for 12.63% of imports to the EU from the US and 56.94% in the opposite direction (panel b, Table 4). 
The second most important sector for the bilateral trade between US and EU (among the four 
considered in this preliminary study) is dairy products. Imports to the EU from US account for 115 
million $ (1.16% of total agri-food trade in this route and direction), while in the reverse direction, 
imports to the US from the EU amount to 1119 million $ (5.91% of total agri-food trade). The least 
important sector is processed rice, with shares in agri-food trade remarkably less than 1%. Cattle meat, 
although of not a high importance compared to beverages, still accounts for 80 million $ of trade from 
the US to the EU, and 41 million $ in the opposite direction (panel b, Table 4). 
In terms of trade shares, intra-EU trade accounts for almost 72% of all agri-food trade, where 
only 2.40% comes from the US (panel c, Table 4). On the contrary, the EU trade share in US imports 
is significantly higher, accounting for almost 20% of US imports. Intra-NAFTA trade accounts for 
34% of agri-food trade, while RoW accounts for a significant 46% of total US agri-food imports. 
Among sectors, extra-EU imports are marginally more important in processed rice and cattle meat, 
where imports coming from the US account for 1.93 and 0.49% of total EU imports, respectively. By 
contrast, equivalent market shares in the US for EU imports, account for 58% in beverages, 47% in 
dairy, 2.6 % in rice and 1% in cattle meat. Therefore, currently, the EU is a much important provider 
of food for the US than the other way round, and accordingly, consumers in the US could benefit from 
a reduction of NTMs that would make imports from the EU cheaper. 
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Table 4.  Bilateral trade between the EU and US in 2007  
a) Trade value (million $) 
  Imports to the EU Imports to US 
  US EU RoW EU NAFTA RoW 
cmt 79.99 12557.71 3839.88 40.61 1089.78 2632.08 
mil 115.00 33570.44 1812.70 1119.79 203.50 1052.23 
pcr 27.79 842.41 567.52 11.88 6.68 442.85 
b_t 1254.22 42235.50 5887.21 10784.18 3738.10 3873.23 
Total agri-food 9933.86 297472.89 106698.44 18940.26 33002.45 44822.34 
b) Sectorial weight with respect to total trade in the agri-food sector 
  Imports to the EU Imports to US 
  US EU RoW EU NAFTA RoW 
cmt 0.81 4.22 3.60 0.21 3.30 5.87 
mil 1.16 11.29 1.70 5.91 0.62 2.35 
pcr 0.28 0.28 0.53 0.06 0.02 0.99 
b_t 12.63 14.20 5.52 56.94 11.33 8.64 
Total agri-food 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
c) Trade shares of exporting regions 
  Imports to the EU Imports to US 
  US EU RoW EU NAFTA RoW 
cmt 0.49 76.21 23.30 1.08 28.96 69.96 
mil 0.32 94.57 5.11 47.14 8.57 44.29 
pcr 1.93 58.59 39.47 2.57 1.45 95.98 
b_t 2.54 85.54 11.92 58.62 20.32 21.06 
Total agri-food 2.40 71.84 25.77 19.57 34.11 46.32 
Source: own calculations based on the GTAP v.8.0 database 
Graph 1, panel a, shows the ad-valorem equivalent of the non-tariff measures imposed by the 
EU to imports coming from US, other EU countries and the rest of the world, for each of the sectors 
analysed. Panel b shows the ad-valorem equivalent imposed by the US to imports coming from the 
EU, rest of NAFTA and rest of the world, calculated as explained in section 3.4. 
Tentative estimates of the ad valorem tariff equivalents of NTMs imposed by the EU 
(including divergences in regulations, standards) on imports coming from the US are 42% in cattle 
meat, 35% in rice, 29% in dairy and 20% in beverages. As expected, the AVE of NTM is minimum 
for intra-EU trade, while the trade cost induced by NTMs applied to imports from the rest of the world 
are intermediate, with a minimum impact in cattle meat and beverages and tobacco (7-8%), 
intermediate in dairy (11%) and maximum in processed rice (14%). Compared to the trade cost 
15 
 
induced by NTMs on extra- in intra-EU trade (Graph 1, left hand side). The EU's AVE calculated on 
cross-Atlantic trade are clearly larger for each sector, where the difference is largest in the cattle meat 
(42% versus 3%), processed rice (35 versus 0%) and dairy (29% versus 3%) sectors.  
The notable result for cattle meat is perhaps expected, particularly given the degree of 
regulatory schemes relating to the long serving EU import restriction on beef from cattle treated with 
growth promoting hormones, whilst EU NTM restrictions on rice imports have been identified in the 
past by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (2007) as a source of frustration for US 
exporters. In the dairy sector, the EU imposes considerable administrative burdens relating to (inter 
alia) milk quality requisites (somatic cell counts), tariff rate quota usage and the usage of generic 
name (i.e., parmesan, feta etc.) (US DEC, 2013). In the case of wines and spirits, EU labelling 
(particularly geographical indicators (GI's)) and packaging regulations, coupled with EU derogations 
on US wine making practice restrict the free flow and trade of these products, although care should be 
taken when interpreting a single aggregate AVE for this sector given the broad sectorial aggregation 
employed in the underlying GTAP database (i.e., this sectors covers all soft drinks; alcohol, wines, 
spirits etc.). 
Graph 1. Ad-valorem equivalents of Non-tariff Measures 
a)      b) 
 
Interestingly, AVEs of NTMs imposed by US in its trade with the EU on cattle meat and 
processed rice are of a similar magnitude to those imposed by the EU to imports coming from the US. 
The estimated US AVE on imports of cattle meat and processed rice from the EU is 39% and 43%, 
respectively. This compares with corresponding sector figures on trade running from the US to EU of 
42% and 35%. This in part reflects the retaliatory nature of sectoral trade relations between the two 
traders. For example, the result for cattle is due to the US sanction on EU origin beef which serves as a 
retaliatory measure for the EU's ban on hormone induced beef.  
In this bilateral EU-US comparison, however, big differences emerge in dairy and beverages, 
with trade costs imposed by the US much lower than the equivalent by the EU. Thus, 20% (29%) of 
AVE imposed by the EU in beverages and tobacco (dairy) coming from the US reduce to 6% (4%) 
imposed by the US on imports coming from the EU. At least in the case of dairy, the estimate 
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presented in our study is perhaps slightly low, given that the US (like the EU) also imposes 
cumbersome administrative regulations on EU producers such as the "Grade A dairy safety document 
for pasteurised milk ordinance" (PMO) which is, according to a detailed survey conducted by 
ECORYS (2009), of a highly prohibitive nature. As for alcoholic beverages, the US imposes cross 
state retailing and distribution red tape restrictions on EU products, whilst the geographical indicator 
which receives much attention within the EU, is not given due consideration by US authorities. In both 
cases, neither NTM is considered to be highly trade prohibitive (ECORYS, 2009), which appears to be 
consistent with the AVE estimate presented in the current study. 
As a final observation, the results presented here are reasonably consistent with the average 
AVE estimate presented by Kee et al. (2009) for agricultural products (27%). On the other hand, this 
study presents lower estimates compared with those reported by ECORYs (2009), who estimate for 
the 'total of processed food sector' an AVE of 56.8% for imports coming from the US to the EU, and 
73.3% for imports coming from the EU to US. Apart from the different sectorial coverage and 
disaggregation, the differences are most likely related to the choice of data, but may also be linked 
with methodological considerations (choice of estimator). 
5. Conclusions 
This year signals the opening of negotiations between the world's two largest trading partners, 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Unfortunately, conventional trade impact 
assessments employing computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are ill equipped to properly 
deal with the potential economic gains from such a deal due to the lack of any coherent and consistent 
database relating to non-tariff measures (NTMs). Indeed, unlike conventional tariff measures, NTMs 
do not have a transparent price effect which can be readily inserted into an economic model. Over the 
last decade, the usage of gravity models has received recognition as one such tool for understanding 
the 'part-worth' of NTM measures on trade restrictiveness. This paper also employs a gravity approach, 
whilst the explorative nature of the research restricts the current focus to four agro-food sectors.  
Preliminary results suggest that NTMs impose a relatively equivalent trade cost on trade flows 
of cattle meat ant processed rice in both directions. In beverages and tobacco and dairy products, 
however, the AVE of NTM is significantly higher for trade running from the US to the EU. 
Accordingly, substantial gains could be obtained by both countries reducing divergences in regulations 
and standards in cattle meat and processed rice, while further gains would be allocated to the US 
producing sector of beverages and tobacco and dairy. 
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